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The subject of interest of the author of the text is the common good as an inalie-
nable element of the organization of the human community. The paper consists 
of three parts. The first part analyses the need for a common good as the basis 
of social and political life. The starting point was the distinction of four forms of 
common life (community, society, political body and state), defining the nature 
of society, presentation of three forms of relationship between man and society 
(individualism, collectivism and personalism) and identifying problems related 
to the definition of the common good. In the second part, the author presented 
a reflection on the procedural common good in the liberal tradition, the issue of 
impartiality and identification of the common good in the process of the debate. 
In the third part, attention is paid to the personalistic view of the common good, 
which is based on the integral development of personal human nature in the 
framework of the appropriate institutions and structures. This understanding 
of the common good is, in the author’s conviction, the best point of reference in 
social and political life.
Key words: common good, forms of social life, human nature, liberalism, perso-
nalism.
Karol Jasiński, Nature of the common good as the foundation of the community50
Introduction
Social and political activity can be understood in two principal ways. First 
of all, in Machiavelli’s spirit, this is an art of effective activities aiming at the 
acquisition and retention of power. Secondly, according to the tradition dating 
back to the thought of Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, Augustine of Hippo and Thomas 
Aquinas, it is defined as reasonable realisation of the common good. 
The issue of the common good is becoming increasingly more visible in the 
contemporary debate concerning the shape of social life. However, it is not 
always accompanied by explanations concerning its nature. While defining the 
meaning of the common good, reference is often made to common intuitions. 
Its indispensability is emphasized since it unifies the activities of individuals 
and determines their direction and aim. 
The subject of the reflections presented below is the common good as an 
inalienable element of organisations concerning various types of human com-
munities. The paper consists of three parts. The first part demonstrates the 
need for the existence of the common good as the basis for social and political 
life. The second part contains a reflection on the procedural common good, 
which is a concept used in the liberal tradition, while the focus on the third 
part is on the personalistic (analogical) approach to the issue which, in the 
opinion of the author, is the most appropriate.
1. The common good – the foundation of social life
Before starting an analysis of the issues pertaining to the common good, it 
is essential to ask first about the genesis and the nature of the community itself. 
At the same time, a distinction should be made between the terms: society, 
community and state, for which this good makes the foundation and keystone.
Distinction between society and community is present in the work of a 
French philosopher, Jacques Maritain. Community is the work of nature, 
shaped by the inborn inclinations of the human being. On the other hand, 
society is consciously shaped by the human being as the work of his intellect 
and free will to realize the goods necessary for his personal development. The 
society of the specific socio-economic organisation is referred to as the “politi-
cal body”. It emerged as a result of pursuing the goal shared by people, namely 
the common good. The common good, reached within the political body, re-
quires, according to Maritain, the existence of a special organ equipped with 
the subordinate power, which is the state. It plays an instrumental function. 
It is superior to other structures and authorities of the political body, but it is 
not superior to the political body. Moreover, it exists only for the purpose of 
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developing this body1. Therefore, it can be claimed that the society, the political 
body and the state are directed towards the common good, which is related to 
the rational and free nature of the human being.
A Polish neo-Thomist, Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, observes that the emergence 
of the society and the state can be explained in two ways: genetic-evolutionary 
and causal-finalistic. In the first approach, they result from the evolution of na-
ture. In the second approach, the human being needs the society and the state 
to develop his personal being2. The aim of the society as the relational being 
is, in Krąpiec’s opinion, a comprehensive development of potentialised human 
personality. Consequently, the human being is not subordinate to society as 
regards his personal activity, but only with regard to material goods3. Thus, 
Krąpiec is closer to the finalistic approach to the society, which assumes the 
need for personal development.
To determine the proper relationships between man and society, three pos-
sible solutions are suggested: individualism, collectivism and personalism. In 
individualism, the rights and interests of the individual are emphasised first 
and foremost, and society is reduced to the role of their guardian. Collectiv-
ism treats man as a state product, while in personalism, the human being is a 
person, i.e. a creature having a value in itself. The society is a community of 
persons, and it is based on the idea of the common good4.
It seems that the adoption of the personalistic perspective in perceiving the 
society and the state is crucial for properly defining relationships between so-
cial groups and the human being as a person, who is given priority in relation 
to all communities. Thus, it is important to pay attention to the personal nature 
of the human being, since it fulfils a fundamental role in the concept of the 
common good.
In this context, the views of an Italian thinker, Vittorio Possenti, according 
to whom difficulties related to the common good are, among other things, a 
consequence of the crisis of the concept of human nature5, should be consid-
ered right. Since the issue of the common good is related to the proper concept 
of human nature, it should be respected and affirmed in social reality.
Nevertheless, the notion of the common good is one of the most difficult. 
It is sometimes used interchangeably with such notions as commonwealth, 
general welfare, social good, public benefit, the happiness of all or the gen-
1 Jacques MARITAIN, Człowiek i państwo, trans. Adam Grobler, Kraków, ZNAK, 1993, 8-10, 
19-20, 26, 117-118.
2 Mieczysław A. KRĄPIEC, Człowiek i prawo naturalne, Lublin, KUL, 1975, 178-179.
3 Mieczysław A. KRĄPIEC, Człowiek i polityka, Lublin, KUL, 2007, 160-161, 174-175.
4 Zdzisław PAWLAK, Formy uczestnictwa człowieka we wspólnocie według Karola Wojtyły, Studia 
Włocławskie, 9 (2006) 51-62, 51.
5 Vittorio POSSENTI, Religia i życie publiczne. Chrześcijaństwo w dobie ponowożytnej, trans. 
Tadeusz Żeleźnik, Warszawa, PAX, 2005, 114-115.
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eral interest. It has been understood differently throughout centuries and was 
sometimes treated as an empty formula.
The common good is, therefore, a concept whose content is difficult to 
specify, which can operate in various ways in the area of ethics, economics 
and politics. Ethics presents its relation to the dignity of the human being and 
the specific system of values6. Some economists claim that the common good 
helps to point out the path towards reducing inequalities and risks and in-
cludes all kinds of material and immaterial resources. Apart from resources, it 
also includes the community, as well as a set of principles, values and norms7. 
In the field of politics, the common good is sometimes treated as an element 
of democratic order, in which the primacy of rights and freedoms of an indi-
vidual over the society is respected8. Consequently, Ernst W. Böckenförde, a 
German lawyer and thinker, distinguishes two components of the common 
good: static-principal and dynamic-purposeful. The former is the human be-
ing as the subject of rights, and the latter – the drive towards developing the 
conditions for the personal life9. Thus, in the opinion of the Polish lawyer and 
philosopher, Marek Piechowiak, the aim of the state is indicated, along with 
the need to determine the common good through human rights and free-
doms10.
The common good is also believed to be a normative category. There are 
four main meanings of the term: aggregative common good (the sum of indi-
vidual goods in the community), common good (goods in common possession 
or aims and values to be achieved), suppressive common good (the advantage 
over the good of individuals) and integral common good (the result of interac-
tion and the condition for interpersonal cooperation)11.
Piechowiak emphasizes two important issues in this context. First of all, 
the community is a condition indispensable for human development, yet it is 
an entity different than the sum of individuals forming this community. Good, 
therefore, cannot be described in categories of the sum of individual goods12. 
Secondly, the common good should be differentiated from the shared good, 
6 Joanna HELIOS, Solidarność i dobro wspólne – kilka uwag w kontekście rozważań o metodach 
rozwiązywania sporów międzypaństwowych na przykładzie Unii Europejskiej, Przegląd Prawa 
i Administracji 94 (2013) 11-25, 13-14.
7 Małgorzata SŁODOWA-HEŁPA, Odkrywanie na nowo dobra wspólnego, Nierówności 
Społeczne a Wzrost Gospodarczy, 3 (2015) 7-24, 15.
8 Marek PIECHOWIAK, Filozoficzne podstawy rozumienia dobra wspólnego, Kwartalnik Filo-
zoficzny, 2 (2003) 5-35, 5.
9 Ernst W. BÖCKENFÖRDE, Wolność-państwo-Kościół, trans. Paweł Kaczorowski, Grzegorz 
Sowiński, Kraków, ZNAK, 1994, 250-252, 263.
10 Piechowiak, Filozoficzne podstawy rozumienia dobra wspólnego…, 15-16, 28-29, 34.
11 Anna MŁYNARSKA-SOBACZEWSKA, Dobro wspólne jako kategoria normatywna, Acta 
Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Iuridica, 69 (2009) 61-72, 61-65.
12 Marek PIECHOWIAK, Filozofia praw człowieka. Prawa człowieka w świetle ich 
międzynarodowej ochrony, Lublin, KUL, 1999, 103; idem, Filozoficzne podstawy rozumienia 
dobra wspólnego…, 13.
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since this second formula exposes obligations and subordination of people to 
the state. It loses the idea of the superiority of human dignity over the interest 
of the state and the group. On the other hand, in the common good, the serving 
role of the state and its obligations towards citizens are acknowledged13. The 
formula of the shared good is additionally related to the emanation (Platonic) 
concept of good, according to which the state has an advantage over individual 
persons and exclusivity in defining the good, while the common good should 
rather be related to the finalistic (Aristotelian) concept of good as the aim of 
the activity14.
An American political theorist, economist and theologian Michael Novak 
additionally emphasizes the problem of the word “common” and the method of 
combining it with the word “good”. The word “common” has two basic senses. 
First of all, common is used to describe something that you share with others. 
Secondly, a certain entity that others can share is also considered common15. It 
seems that the first sense is more appropriate since the common good should 
be identified with a potentialised personal nature, in which specific freedoms 
and rights would be incorporated. It would provide the foundation and the 
reason for the existence of the society and the state, the aim of which should be 
its comprehensive development. 
2. The common good and the liberal tradition
Liberalism, in the deepest belief of the political scientist Rafał Prostak, has 
been, and continues to be, a response to all attempts to construct excessively 
ambitious political projects, in which the common good is defined in a theo-
logical manner. The purpose of narrowing the political sphere is to liberate 
the non-political potential of individuals. The political sphere must be inde-
pendent from perfectionistic projects constructed in the private sphere, which 
are characterized by holding a specific vision of the common good16. In the 
liberal tradition, the discourse over the issue of the common good was there-
fore moved to the private sphere, and the political sphere was freed from it, in 
the name of the specifically interpreted neutrality and focus on the protection 
of the freedom of individuals.
The American political philosopher William A. Galston quotes three basic 
arguments of liberals to support the state neutrality. First of all, there is no 
13 Piechowiak, Filozoficzne podstawy rozumienia dobra wspólnego…, 8-10.
14 Danuta RADZISZEWSKA-SZCZEPANIAK, Polityka jako roztropna realizacja dobra wspól-
nego. Ujęcie Mieczysława Alberta Krąpca, Studia Elbląskie, 15 (2014) 315-331, 319.
15 Michael NOVAK, Wolne osoby i dobro wspólne, trans. Grzegorz Łuczkiewicz, Kraków, ZNAK, 
1998, 233.
16 Rafał PROSTAK, Polityka liberalna i religia. Refleksje nad rozumem publicznym Johna Rawlsa 
koncepcjami pokrewnymi, Kultura i Polityka, 6 (2009) 14-32, 16-17.
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common rational foundation which would make it possible to make choices 
among various lifestyles. Secondly, imposing a certain concept of a good life 
would be an infringement of individual freedom as the superior value. Thirdly, 
variety is a value in itself, and the resignation from it results in huge social 
losses17. Liberals, therefore, give up on the issue of the common good to pre-
serve rationality, freedom and diversity, which are essential elements in their 
understanding of social reality. 
Moreover, liberals do not like to refer to the common good because it im-
plies, in their opinion, a mysterious theory of cognition. Besides, only excep-
tional and virtuous individuals are, in their opinion, able to define this good 
and to show it to other people18. 
Thus, the narrative of the neutrality (impartiality) of liberalism is prevail-
ing in discussions over the issue of the common good, as exemplified by the 
views of the American social philosopher, John Rawls. He called for the social 
order to be based on two principles of justice, which he understood in terms 
of impartiality with regard to the good. According to the first principle, every 
person should have an equal right to fundamental freedoms that are compat-
ible with similar freedoms of others. The second principle refers to the social 
and economic inequalities existing among people. They should be arranged in 
such a way to lead to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged people and to 
equal access to offices19.
However, the Canadian philosopher, Charles Taylor, criticizes the liberal 
idea of neutrality. Its consequence may be, in his opinion, the absence of state 
unity and a lack of identification of people with the community. He points out 
that neutrality is an effect of the atomic ontology of the liberal community. 
In this situation, the common good is often reduced to the sum of individual 
goods. However, Taylor observes liberalism does not have to assume atomic 
ontology. Likewise, the state community does not have to be instrumental in 
nature, i.e. merely help to achieve individual goods20.
The common good, being the sum of individual goods, is defined by an 
American political scientist, Robert A. Dahl, as a distributive concept of good21. 
In the opinion of Possenti, it is then brought down to the set of private prefer-
ences22. In the opinion of the Polish personalist Stanisław Kowalczyk, under-
17 William A. GALSTON, Cele liberalizmu, trans. Andrzej Pawelec, Kraków, ZNAK, 1999, 99-
100.
18 Paweł ŚPIEWAK, W stronę wspólnego dobra, Warszawa, Fundacja Aletheia, 1998, 35.
19 John RAWLS, Teoria sprawiedliwości, trans. Maciej Panufnik, Jarosław Pasek, Adam Roma-
niuk, Warszawa, PWN, 1994, 48-49, 360, 414-416.
20 Charles TAYLOR, Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge (Ma) – London, Harvard University 
Press, 1995, 181, 186, 188-189, 194-197.
21 Robert A. DAHL, Demokracja i jej krytycy, trans. Stefan Amsterdamski, Kraków – Warszawa, 
ZNAK, 1995, 107, 109, 143.
22 Possenti, Religia i życie publiczne…, 112.
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standing the common good by liberals only as the sum of individual goods 
leads to the depersonalisation of social life23.
However, it should not be forgotten that Rawls emphasises, on the one 
hand, the role of justice as impartiality with regard to the good, and on the 
other hand, he mentions the primary social goods to which every person must 
have access. These include income, wealth, power, rights, freedoms, oppor-
tunities and self-esteem. Alongside the natural primary goods (e.g. health, 
intelligence), social primary goods are an object of desire and aspiration for all 
people24. It should also be noted that Rawls modified his concept over time. He 
stressed that democratic institutions of political society were a certain good 
for citizens because they enable the development of moral authorities, facili-
tate cooperation and guarantee equality and freedom. Moreover, he believed 
that justice was complementary to the good and its various facets25. In this 
context, Possenti raises an important issue. He observes that in the name of 
alleged impartiality, a certain concept of good, identified with an autonomous 
moral personality, is privileged26, since each person, in the name of freedom, 
can choose their own good, which, however, cannot interfere with the good 
chosen by other people.
It is worth noting that classic liberalism never doubted the existence of the 
common good, often describing it the “public good”27. The common good can 
be the rights of an individual, individual safety28, pursuit of happiness, satisfy-
ing one’s own needs29, the welfare of all people30, development possibilities or 
principles of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between people with vari-
ous world views31.
Prostak also believes that liberalism stresses the importance of certain 
public goods, such as individual freedom and responsibility, individualism 
and openness, change and diversity tolerance, respect for human rights, social 
23 Stanisław KOWALCZYK, Liberalizm i jego filozofia, Katowice, Unia, 1995, 122.
24 Rawls, Teoria sprawiedliwości…, 89, 348, 416.
25 John RAWLS, Liberalizm polityczny, trans. Adam Romaniuk, Warszawa, PWN, 1998, 244-292.
26 Possenti, Religia i życie publiczne…, 172.
27 Stephen HOLMES, Anatomia antyliberalizmu, trans. Jakub Szacki, Kraków, ZNAK, 1998, 268-
271. 
28 Novak, Wolne osoby i dobro wspólne…, 11.
29 Anna MARKWART, Marta SZYMAŃSKA, Dobro jednostki dobrem społeczeństwa czy dobro 
społeczeństwa dobrem jednostki? George Berkeley i Adam Smith o postrzeganiu i moralności, 
Etyka, 46 (2013) 21-34, 21, 26-28.
30 Ludwig von MISES, Liberalism in the Classical Tradition, trans. Ralph Raico, New York, Foun-
dation for Economic Education, 1985, 7-8.
31 Dorota SEPCZYŃSKA, Katolicyzm i liberalizm. Szkic z filozofii społecznej, Kraków, NOMOS, 
2008, 259-260.
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peace and legal rules32. Consequently, some authors stress that the common 
good is constituted by the rule of law33.
Attention is also drawn to the problem of identifying the common good. It 
is a consequence of pluralism and the size of political communities. Members 
of a large political community have conflicting views on the common good and 
on the ways to achieve it. The common good is therefore difficult to define. As a 
result, attempts are made to give up on its definition and reduce it to particular 
areas of life34.
However, the theorists of social life try to indicate certain ways of identify-
ing the common good. Some of those suggestions are examined below. 
According to Taylor, there are two basic ways to identify the social good. 
The first is achieved as a result of referring man to the horizon of practices, in-
stitutions and meanings existing in a particular culture. The second way con-
sists in an agreement between individuals35. Taylor also appreciates the role of 
the community and the discourse within it, which contributes to articulation 
and realisation of this good36. A Scottish historian of ideas and ethics, Alasdair 
MacIntyre, presents similar views on this issue37. 
In a liberal democracy, the definition of the common good should also take 
place within the framework of an open social debate, according to the Polish 
political philosopher, Andrzej Szahaj. In his opinion, no one has the right to 
state what the common good is for a given community, without subjecting it 
to the judgment of other people who can freely express themselves. Otherwise, 
there is a danger of monopolisation and usurpation of the common good by a 
specific social group. This is how paternalism or curatorship is born. This, in 
turn, leads to alienation and rebellion of a part of the society which is deprived 
of influence on the definition of the common good. This destroys the spirit of 
community for the benefit of fractions that are at odds with each other38.
The role of the debate, the aim of which is not only to identify the common 
good and the ways of its realisation but which is in itself a constituent of that 
good should, therefore, be appreciated. It starts with the recognition of human 
dignity, equality of people in their dignity and the correlation of rights and ob-
32 John LOCKE, Dwa traktaty o rządzie, trans. Zbigniew Rau, Warszawa, PWN, 1992, 256-258, 
263-264, 286-287; Stephen Macedo, Cnoty liberalne, trans. Grzegorz Łuczkiewicz, Kraków, 
ZNAK, 1995, 320-321, 335, 343-346.
33 Rafał PROSTAK, Rzecz o sprawiedliwości. Komunitarystyczna krytyka współczesnego liberal-
izmu amerykańskiego, Kraków, UJ, 2004, 184.
34 Dahl, Demokracja i jej krytycy…, 418, 420.
35 Taylor, Philosophical Arguments…, 136-140.
36 Charles TAYLOR, Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, 292.
37 Alasdair MacINTYRE, Dziedzictwo cnoty. Studium z teorii moralności, trans. Adam Chmie-
lewski, Warszawa, PWN, 1996, 37, 343. 
38 Andrzej SZAHAJ, Liberalizm, wspólnotowość, równość. Eseje z filozofii polityki, Toruń, UMK, 
2012, 94-95, 157.
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ligations. It allows us to better understand not only the truth that is the subject 
of the dialogue, but also the other person. It also enables an empathetic at-
titude, the development of principles and compromises for a harmonious life39.
The Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka emphasises, in particu-
lar, the importance of the debate taking place within civil society. Individuals 
define the common good through participation in voluntary groups and asso-
ciations (e.g. cultural, religious) that enable them to articulate their views and 
discuss them collectively40. 
It can, therefore, be seen that for liberals a key role in identifying and articu-
lating the common good in liberal democracy is played by the debate taking 
place within civil society. It is a network of institutions independent of the state 
(associations) that unite citizens around issues of common concern. However, 
problems with identifying the common good can also lead to other solutions. 
One of them is a procedural understanding of this good. Liberals sometimes 
reduce it to a set of specified principles, helping people to make their own 
choices as regards their own concept of a good life.
The rules and procedures aim to develop a habit of cooperation between 
people and to achieve the benefits of this cooperation. Therefore, the nature of 
the common good is formal41. In liberalism, it consists of procedures, practices 
and institutions that allow individuals to formulate their own visions of a good 
life42. Procedures are important because of a lack of common understanding 
of people’s values and interests. Moreover, the more concrete the values and 
interests are, the more likely people are to disagree on their specific content. It 
is precisely because of this disagreement that the common good is understood 
as a set of practices, institutions and procedures supporting a personal choice. 
However, the good of an individual is the result of their own choice43.
In this respect, a distinction is made between the material and formal un-
derstanding of the common good in social life. A material common good is 
the intentions and goals determined by a collective decision of the members 
of the community. The formal common good, also known as the procedural 
good, consists in ensuring the benefits of cooperation based on procedures44. 
However, the essence of the common good would be its formal dimension45.
According to Prostak, the procedural concept of liberalism is unsatisfactory, 
since society must rely on a specific concept of good. We deal in it with certain 
39 Jan WAL, Realizacja dobra wspólnego w dialogu i poprzez dialog, Warszawskie Studia Pasto-
ralne, 12 (2010) 60-75, 64-70. 
40 Will KYMLICKA, Współczesna filozofia polityczna, trans. Andrzej Pawelec, Kraków, ZNAK, 
1998, 230, 247, 255.
41 Novak, Wolne osoby i dobro wspólne…, 111-112.
42 Rafał PROSTAK, Teista w demoliberalnym świecie. Rzecz o amerykańskich rozważaniach 
wokół rozumnej polityki, Kraków, OMP, 2014, 341-342.
43 Dahl, Demokracja i jej krytycy…, 424-427.
44 Helios, Solidarność i dobro wspólne…, 15; Prostak, Rzecz o sprawiedliwości…, 178-179, 184. 
45 Novak, Wolne osoby i dobro wspólne…, 229.
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superior goods of the general social nature (e.g. justice, freedom, equality and 
human rights)46. On the other hand, Taylor emphasizes that certain goods are 
incorporated in the social life of the liberal society47. In his opinion, the state 
defends at least such values as equality and freedom of pursuing the goal48. In 
Taylor’s opinion, liberalism presents two visions of society. The first of them 
refers only to certain procedures, while the second one – to a specific concept 
of the common good49. Therefore, it seems that it is not possible to avoid any 
reference to the common good in the social and political forum.
3. A personalistic vision of the common good
In this situation, it is worth investigating the proposal formulated by the 
representatives of personalism. It is a way of thinking that can also have an 
impact on the social and political dimension of human life as a personal being. 
It should be emphasised at the outset that a personalistic vision of the com-
mon good presupposes a specific social ontology. It takes the primacy of the 
human person as a substantialist entity over the community. A person should 
be treated as an aim of an action and never as a tool or object. In this context, 
the common good has two dimensions: subjective (the state of human perfec-
tion as a goal in itself) and objective (the set of conditions under which perfec-
tion can be achieved)50. Therefore, the principal common good is a man as the 
goal in himself51. His development is the foundation and sense of the existence 
for a community52.
In Kowalczyk’s opinion, the personalistic concept of the common good al-
lows for the distinction of its components: internal and external. The nature of 
the internal element is ontological and axiological, i.e. the good is the integral 
development of the human person and the set of values necessary to achieve 
this. Man develops, just like his psychophysical nature. He, therefore, needs vi-
tal and economic values, as well as cognitive, moral and aesthetic ones. The ex-
ternal component of the common good is the set of structures, institutions and 
social and economic conditions necessary for development. Those structures 
46 Rafał PROSTAK, Liberalna autonomia, komunitarystyczna heteronomia. Charles Taylor jako 
krytyk „Teorii sprawiedliwości” Johna Rawlsa, in: Bronisław Misztal, Marek Przychodzień 
(eds.), Aktualność wolności. Wybór tekstów, Warszawa, Fundacja Aletheia, 2005, 239-266, 258-
261.
47 Taylor, Philosophical Arguments…, 257-258, 287.
48 Jocelyn MACLURE, Charles TAYLOR, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, trans. Jane M. 
Todd, Cambridge (Ma), Harvard University Press, 2011, 16-17.
49 Charles TAYLOR, Reconciling the Solitudes. Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism, 
Montreal – London – Buffalo, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994, 177-178.
50 Piechowiak, Filozoficzne podstawy rozumienia dobra wspólnego…, 19-20, 31-34.
51 Amitai ETZIONI, The Third Way to a Good Society, London, Demos, 2000, 11, 34-37.
52 Stanisław KOWALCZYK, Zarys filozofii polityki, Lublin, KUL, 2008, 138.
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are of instrumental nature. The common good is dynamic since the human be-
ing develops in different conditions53. The common good is sometimes defined 
as the sum of those social and political conditions which allow individuals or 
social groups to achieve their own perfection and development more fully and 
quickly54. However, the problem is to determine what makes this “sum” of con-
ditions. In this regard, it would probably be appropriate to stress in the concept 
of the common good the development of the human person in terms of their 
freedom55.
In another place, Kowalczyk will stress that the common good is a formal 
element of every community, especially the state community. It gives it a shape 
and a sense of existence56. However, Novak emphasizes that beside the formal 
aspect of the good of the community, we deal with its material dimension. It 
covers multiple, sometimes contradictory elements57.
Following MacIntyre, it should be assumed that the common good is first 
of all realisation of the personal nature of the human being, in which a cer-
tain logos is inscribed. This nature should be additionally understood within 
a broader moral order, which gives it a meaning. The moral order would be of 
teleological nature. Its demonstration would be potentialised human nature 
and its direction towards becoming real58. A similar approach is represented 
by Taylor59.
Consequently, Krąpiec emphasizes that the good as the real being is the 
aim of the human aspiration60. Thus personalism assumes the finalistic con-
cept of good, being the aim of the activity. The good of the human being is an 
increasingly fuller realisation of their potentiality inscribed in their nature and 
revealed through natural (biological and spiritual) inclinations. Such an aim 
may become the common good, realized in an analogical (similar, relevant) 
way by every human being. Krąpiec observes at the same time that an increase 
in the good of a specific person is always an increase in the good of the entire 
society61. Consequently, Novak emphasizes that if anybody neglects their own 
development, they harm the entire society by their neglect62.
Krąpiec distinguishes between personal and subjective common good. The 
personal common good consists in the self-improvement of the human being, 
53 Stanisław KOWALCZYK, Człowiek a społeczność. Zarys filozofii społecznej, Lublin, KUL, 1994, 
234-239; idem, Zarys filozofii polityki…, 138-139. 
54 Helios, Solidarność i dobro wspólne…, 21.
55 Tomasz CZERNIK, Indywidualizm, komunitaryzm i trzecia droga, Perspectiva. Legnickie Stu-
dia Teologiczno-Historyczne, 2 (2011) 21-35, 32.
56 Kowalczyk, Zarys filozofii polityki…, 134.
57 Novak, Wolne osoby i dobro wspólne, 234-235, 239.
58 MacIntyre, Dziedzictwo cnoty…, 78-79, 112-115.
59 Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences…, 257-259.
60 Mieczysław A. KRĄPIEC, O ludzką politykę, Lublin, KUL, 1998, 79.
61 Krąpiec, Człowiek i prawo naturalne…, 180-186. 
62 Novak, Wolne osoby i dobro wspólne…, 201-203, 236, 243.
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realisation of basic natural inclinations, and actualisation of one’s own poten-
tiality in terms of cognition, freedom and love. The binding with it is not by 
an external order, but results from within. Only thus understood good can be 
shared by all people and can become the reason for the existence of the com-
munity. It is infinite because the acts of knowledge and love can grow in man 
infinitely, and non-antagonistic because this growth does not harm anyone. On 
the other hand, no material goods, which are merely means for the develop-
ment of the personal human good, can be considered the common good. The 
subjective common good are objects of personal activity, which include truth, 
goodness and beauty63. Krąpiec also emphasizes that in the domain of personal 
rights, man remains free and does not serve the state, but the state serves the 
man. The subordination to the state is only in respect of material goods64.
In the opinion of a personalist from Cracow, Karol Wojtyła, the common 
good, understood as striving for personal development in the community and 
for self-fulfilment, is an expression of human transcendence65. He emphasizes 
that the common good refers to the domain of living with others. Its purpose 
is the fulfilment of the person, which is achieved through a genuine act. It con-
sists in recognizing the truth in one’s own conscience and its free choice. The 
condition determining a fulfilment of a person is, therefore, obedience to the 
conscience, in which the truth is experienced and the conviction of the obliga-
tion to act emerges66. An important attribute of the human nature is, therefore, 
freedom, which is realized in relation to the truth. The purpose (good) of hu-
man existence is to discover the truth in one’s own conscience and to subordi-
nate one’s existence to it. 
Bearing in mind the personalistic concept of the common good, one should 
conclude that a definition of the common good cannot be made independently 
of the way the good itself is understood. It is in the nature of good to be the aim 
of the activity. The nature of the aim, on the other hand, is to be a motive for 
action. Good, as an aim, is the foundation and bond of every community. Its 
perception is related to the need to recognize the potential of the human being 
(to preserve life, to pass it on to the offspring and to develop cognition, love 
and creativity), which requires actualisation. The good expressed in terms of 
finality can be the good of both a particular person and the whole community. 
It does not antagonize, it does not exclude anyone, but everyone can participate 
in it. Bearing this good in mind, the primacy of the personal sphere over the 
social reality is respected, because the person as a substance is superior to the 
63 Mieczysław A. KRĄPIEC, Dobro wspólne, in: Andrzej Maryniarczyk and others (eds.), Pow-
szechna Encyklopedia Filozofii, vol. 2, Lublin, PTTA, 2001, 628-639, 631-633.
64 Krąpiec, Człowiek i prawo naturalne…, 190-191.
65 Karol WOJTYŁA, Osoba: podmiot i wspólnota, in: idem, Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antro-
pologiczne, Lublin, KUL, 2000, 371-414, 406.
66 Karol WOJTYŁA, Osoba i czyn, in: idem, Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne, Lu-
blin, KUL, 2000, 43-344, 181, 185, 194-210, 319-322.
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community. However, the common good can only be achieved in the commu-
nity, that is, in relations with other people67. 
Conclusion 
The subject of the investigations presented above was the common good as 
an inalienable element of organisations made by various types of human com-
munities. The discussion consisted of three parts. The first one demonstrated 
the need for the existence of the common good as the foundation for the social 
and political life. The second one involved a reflection over the relationship 
between the liberal tradition and the issue of the common good. In the third 
one, attention was drawn to the personalistic approach towards this problem 
which, in the Author’s opinion, is the most appropriate in the social life organ-
isation process.
It should probably be assumed that social and political life is not a mat-
ter of chance, but is generally shaped by purpose. It has its foundation and its 
raison d’etre, which is the common good that can be understood in three fun-
damental ways: material, formal and analogical. The first two approaches seem 
to be insufficient. The common good cannot be reduced to a broadly defined 
set of specific goods, which can only be a means to achieve an aim. Nor can 
the common good be reduced to a series of procedures aimed at a harmonious 
coexistence and cooperation of people. The third solution should, therefore, be 
adopted, which, based on a finalistic understanding of the good as an aim of 
action, emphasises that the common good consists in the development and ful-
filment of the personal (psychophysical) nature of man within the framework 
of relevant structural and institutional conditions. The common good is, in a 
sense, of a formal nature, because it gives shape and purpose to the state com-
munity. However, it always involves a reference to the complete development of 
the man, which occurs in proportion to his abilities, and its specific means and 
ways are historically, culturally and socially determined. The common good 
would, therefore, be the good of the person whose development would be fos-
tered by certain goods for a person as a means to an end.
An analogical understanding of the common good is present in the person-
alistic vision of society, which has been built on certain anthropology. Its essen-
tial element is the conviction about the existence of a specific human nature, 
i.e. a being who is the source of action. According to personalists, the man has a 
personal nature. As a human being, he is a substantial spiritual-corporal entity, 
the aim of any action and an entity worth of affirmation. Every society, includ-
ing the state, exists because of him. Through established laws, structures and 
67 Danuta RADZISZEWSKA-SZCZEPANIAK, Charakterystyczne rysy filozofii polityki 
Mieczysława A. Krąpca, Przegląd Tomistyczny, 21 (2015) 525-537, 530-533. 
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institutions, a human being should be provided with appropriate conditions for 
the development of potentiality hidden in their nature. The state, however, can-
not succumb to the temptation of paternalism. Its role should be limited solely 
to creating conditions and ensuring social order. It cannot usurp the right to 
decide for individuals what is best for their personal development. Thus, not 
only will the state fulfil its function, but also man will fulfil himself as a person.
Karol Jasiński*
Priroda općeg dobra kao temelja zajednice
Sažetak
Rad obrađuje opće dobro kao neotuđiv element organizacije ljudske zajednice, 
a sastoji se od triju dijelova. Prvi dio analizira potrebu za općim dobrom kao 
osnovom društvenog i političkog života. Autor polazi od razlikovanja četiriju 
oblika zajedničkog života (zajednica, društvo, političko tijelo i država), zatim 
definira prirodu društva, predstavlja tri oblika odnosa čovjeka i društva (indi-
vidualizam, kolektivizam i personalizam) te identificira probleme povezane s 
definicijom općeg dobra. U drugom dijelu autor predstavlja razmišljanje o pro-
ceduralnom općem dobru u liberalnoj tradiciji, pitanju nepristranosti i identi-
ficiranju općeg dobra u procesu rasprave. U trećem dijelu autor obraća pažnju 
na personalistički pogled na opće dobro koje se temelji na cjelovitom razvoju 
osobne ljudske prirode u okviru odgovarajućih institucija i struktura. Prema 
autorovu uvjerenju, ovakvo je razumijevanje općeg dobra najbolja referentna 
točka u društvenom i političkom životu.
Ključne riječi: liberalizam, ljudska priroda, oblici društvenog života, opće do-
bro, personalizam.
(na hrv. prev. Vlaho Kovačević)
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